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This paper offers an alternative reading of the Abbé Sieyès and the modern ‘nation-
state’ problématique. I argue that the subject/object that is constituted in the early 
days of modernity is the incomplete society: an impossible-possibility ideal of 
congruency of population, authority and space. I suggest reading this ideal of 
congruency as a fantasy in that it offers a certain ‘fullness to come’, the promise of 
jouissance that can never be attained and is thus constantly re-envisioned and re-
invoked. Drawing on discourse-analytical and psychoanalytical tools I explain the 
logic of fantasy before analysing Sieyès’ What is the Third Estate?, as I show how he 
critiques and fragments the old model of the state and how his reading of the nation is 
fantasmatic, a continuous project towards impossible congruency.  
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Critiques of modernity have pointed to late eighteenth century Europe and specifically 
the French Revolution and the writings of the Abbé Sieyès as the modern birth-place 
of the ‘nation-state’ problématique.1 That is, the problematic emergence of the 
principle of congruency of nation and state sovereignty. As Robert Wokler puts it: 
‘the modern state since the French Revolution requires that the represented – that is, 
the people as a whole – be a moral person as well, national unity going hand in hand 
with the political unity of the state’.2 To the anthropologist Ernest Gellner the 
principle of congruency is at the heart of modern nationalism as ‘[n]ationalist 
sentiments are deeply offended by violations of the nationalist principle of 
congruence of state and nation’, for ‘[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle, 
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’.3  
 This ideal of congruency is still pervasive in our contemporary discourses, 
practices and policies at both domestic and international levels. In mainstream 
political science and international relations the lack of congruency is the root cause of 
conflict, affecting the stability and territorial integrity of polities world-wide. 
Security, stability and good governance are thus the result of a unity or even a fusion 
of national sentiments with territorial-sovereign demarcations such that the war-
proneness of regions like the Middle-East is attributed to their lack of congruency, or 
what some defined as a ‘state-to-nation imbalance’.4 
 Practicing congruency is, nonetheless, much more subtle and ‘banal’ than the 
above examples of war and/or the territorial disintegration of states, nor is the 
principle of congruency to be solely associated with expressions of chauvinist-
nationalism or the atrocities of mass killings – it is not simply ‘pathological 
homogenisation’ practices ‘... that state-builders have employed to signify the unity of 
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their state and the legitimacy of their authority’.5 Consider the scholarship on 
multiculturalism, communitarianism and liberal nationalism in which the exclusionary 
practices of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia are rejected but the ideal of 
congruency is nonetheless key.6 Nationalism and a sense of communitarian unity are 
not contradictory to the principles of liberalism but rather commensurable and 
complementary as the goal of multiculturalism is ‘… not to balkanize the nation, but 
rather to find a new modus vivendi for achieving national unity’, 7 a model of societal 
‘unity in diversity’.8  
 Establishing congruency through non-ethnic/sectarian models of societal unity 
is quite pervasive in the scholarship on nations and nationalism, theories of the state 
as well as literature on post-conflict societies. Some have suggested that congruency 
has been established historically in polities where strong functioning state control was 
ascertained before the advent of modern national fervour, that is, where the state 
preceded the nation, as it were.9 To others this was defined as a ‘state-nation’ model, 
which may also be applied to post-conflict societies en route to democratization, 
whereas some have further developed and elaborated the models of civic-nationalism 
and patriotism as opposed to the exclusionary models of ethnic-based nationalism.10 
 This paper takes a Nietzschean (1988 [1887]) perspective and thus a 
genealogical approach and asks ‘how did we get here?’11 Within the framework of 
European/‘Western’ thought, under which conditions have we come to define our 
socio-political existence, problems and solutions in terms of unity and congruency? 
Under which conditions has the principle of congruency, however defined, come to be 
rendered intelligible and legitimate even in modalities that seek to break-away from 
the exclusionary vocabulary of (ethno-) nationalism? 
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 To merely begin answering these questions I suggest we revisit the ‘nation-
state’ problématique by interrogating one of the constituting text on the ‘nation-state’ 
in modernity: the Abbé Sieyès’ What is the Third Estate? I would argue that the 
‘nation-state’ discourse in modernity does talk of congruency and unity, but not 
merely of the ‘nation-state’ qua a state of a nation or a Nationalstaat.12 Rather, the 
‘nation-state’ model refers to the fantasy of the ‘congruent society’. This is a society 
that from the late eighteenth century knows and evaluates its identity through the 
fantasy of congruency between population, authority and space, broadly defined. 
What Sieyès does, I argue, is neither to fuse the nation with the state (through the 
language of popular sovereignty and constituent power), nor is Sieyès’ discourse ‘… a 
continuation of the Hobbesian theory of indirect popular sovereignty.13 Rather, what 
Sieyès suggests is a complete disavowal of the state model of early-modernity, that is, 
a break-up, fragmentation and critique of the Hobbesian state of early-modernity as 
modality of congruency, and construct instead an impossible idea(l) of the congruent 
society, not of the ‘nation-state’ qua fusion of nation with state.14  
I further maintain that this ideal of congruency can be read as a fantasy, or a 
fantasmatic project, an endless endeavour of overcoming the lack and contingency of 
social life by offering a ‘fullness-to-come’.15 The idea of congruency is a fantasy for 
it masks the disunity of, and the split in, society by offering an explanation for why 
‘society’ (the ‘nation’, the ‘people’ and other tropes referring to an imagined 
collectivity) is not yet congruent and by promising resolution and thus unity ‘… once 
a named or implied obstacle is overcome’.16 Since such a mode of wholeness, a fixed 
identity, is never possible congruency has constantly to be re-imagined and 
reinvigorated, a certain utopia that is never ascertained and hence continuously re-
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invoked.17 In a way, this is the ‘permanent crisis’ of the ‘nation-state’ that Hont refers 
to when he offers 
 a happy escape from death, which falls short of achieving a utopian return to real 
health. In such a scenario the patient stumbles from one relapse to the next, the 
‘crisis’ always recurring, yet constantly changing in its precise nature and location.18 
 
Revisiting the conventional ‘nation-state’ discourse has important implications for our 
contemporary theories and models of socio-political life. Firstly, it allows us to 
examine the issue of congruency which is a leitmotif in modernity, but that is usually 
lost in the literature or at least made concomitant to sovereignty, territoriality and the 
‘state’.19 Secondly, revisiting Sieyès’ Third Estate may also contribute to the common 
focus on Sieyès’ discourse as a theory of representation and the notion of the 
constituent power as I suggest that Sieyès’ Third Estate does not only have a juridical 
function, but a fantasmatic one thus explaining how the concept of the nation is 
inherently split, seeking continuously to locate the Other, who/which hinders the 
congruency fantasy.20 Thirdly, focusing on the fantasy of congruency and the ideal of 
the ‘congruent society’ exposes how various contemporary discourses that seek to 
escape from the vocabulary of the ‘nation-state’, statism and nationalism – e.g., 
communitarianism, multiculturalism, ‘civic nationalism’, consociationalism – 
nonetheless subscribe to the ideal of congruency, a unity of population, authority and 
space.21 The potential contribution of this paper thus rests in introducing a different 
lexicon for understanding modernity’s preoccupation with the fantasy of congruency, 
however constructed, and thus to potentially change ‘the way in which a situation is 
apprehended’ and political intervention is rendered possible.22  
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To offer this somewhat alternative reading of the ‘nation-state’ in modernity, I 
interrogate the ‘discursive practices’ by which the ideal of congruency is rendered 
palpable in Sieyès, that is, the ways in which congruency is constituted and 
legitimated.23 This paper, however, is not an intellectual history of European 
modernity; a quest to find the origins of nations and nationalism, nor will I be 
contextualising Sieyès’ work within late eighteenth century French politics.24 Rather, 
I am reading Sieyès from the present and with the objective to offer a different 
reading of modernity and the nation-state problématique and thus free-up the 
possibility to problematise the present, that is, to de-naturalise contemporary 
apparatuses of congruency-making (something I will point to in the conclusion but not 
explore due to space limitation).     
 The paper has two main parts: Firstly, I explain the psychoanalytical category 
of fantasy and how it draws on the Lacanian vocabulary of the Mirror Stage, 
jouissance and desire. This part will thus demonstrate how the logic of fantasy can be 
deployed to analyse the ideal of (national/societal) congruency. Secondly, I analyse 
the Abbé Sieyès’ text What is the Third Estate? ([1789] 2003: 92-162), as I deploy the 
‘discursive practices approach’. Herein, I demonstrate how the state modality of 
early-modernity is not fused with the nation; rather, it is fragmented and critiqued and 
how from that moment on the subject that emerges is that of society, an ideal of 
collectivity desiring to achieve the impossible mode of congruity. Finally, I conclude 
by pointing to avenues for future research. 
 
The Logic of Fantasy  
We may begin discussing fantasy by elucidating Lacan’s ‘Mirror Stage’, a key 
starting point to understanding Lacan’s logic of fantasy. 25 The Mirror Stage, the 
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moment in a child’s early development in which the child recognises him/herself in 
the mirror, is precisely the moment in which human subjectivity is rendered both 
meaningful and incomplete. The Mirror Stage is thus an alienating phase because 
what the child sees in the mirror is both more ‘real’ and less ‘real’ to what the child 
(and the adult person) can identify and identify with. 26  The ‘imago’ is more real 
because it captures the entirety of the subject’s body, indeed as it is seen by others in 
the environment, an imago which the subject can perhaps imagine but not fully 
capture. One’s own bodily entirety is not accessible to one’s senses as it is to one’s 
environment. But the ‘imago’ is also less real because it is not ‘really’ the subject’s 
being. To begin with it has no materiality, nor depth as it is a mirage. It is less real 
also because it offers an inverted image of one’s body, i.e. a ‘mirror image’.     
The ‘imago’ is thus an ‘alienating identity’27 as it both captures the whole of 
the subject’s body, which the subject can never achieve, and at the same time it 
negates its core being, further distancing the ability for one to capture one’s 
subjectivity. 28 The imago thus offers an ‘Ideal-I, i.e. as an I that can never be 
realized’.29 This is how and why the Mirror Stage helps us understand the logic of 
fantasy, a support of sorts for the incompleteness of social reality that is more real and 
less real to that of society, the nation, the state or any form of imaginary collectivity, 
and that precisely because of this must continuously aspire to capture its 
being/becoming in the world.    
The imago of society is always in flux and ambivalent at its core, in the same 
manner that a child both identifies with and is alienated by his/her mirror image. The 
function of fantasy is thus to cover this lack, this ambivalence and ambiguity of 
being/becoming. Fantasies or fantasmatic projects are thus similar to what Taylor 
defined as ‘social imaginaries’: 
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... the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, 
how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally 
met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.30 
  
Fantasy thus always attempts to frame the ideal society in which we wish to live; it 
sets the criteria by which the ‘good life’ can be attained. Fantasy constantly strives to 
cover the lack, the incompleteness and indeed void of and within society. As such, 
fantasy, or fantasmatic projects, constantly aspire ‘to account for the unpredictability, 
indeed, the contingent nature of social life by providing an ideal and reassuring 
blueprint for a fixed and structured world’, a certain necessary utopia, that is, the 
future promise of fulfilment in which fantasy is realised, although a realisation that 
can never be attained as I explain below. 31 
Taylor’s ‘social imaginaries’, nonetheless, only offers part of the story since 
fantasy is not merely a social imaginary, an ideal utopian world that aspires to 
transcend or negate reality and our troubled present. Quite the opposite, fantasy 
operates as the supporter of the present reality: 
Are we than dealing here with the simple opposition between reality and its fantasy 
supplement? The topology is more complex: what precedes fantasy is not reality but a 
hole in reality, its point of impossibility filled in with fantasy (Žižek, 2008: xiv).32  
 
Fantasy, therefore, should not be read as the antonym of ‘reality’; rather, it is that 
which constructs and renders ‘reality’ possible – a reality that is contingent and in 
which society, the nation, ‘we’ is anything but a homogeneous symbolism. As Žižek 
puts it: ‘[f]antasy is the ultimate support of reality: “reality” stabilizes itself when 
some fantasy-frame of a “symbolic-bliss” forecloses the view into the abyss of the 
Real’.33 This is because ‘fantasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty space of 
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a fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void’.34 We could, therefore, read 
‘fantasy’ as a socially constructed project that envisions a certain ideal, thus entailing 
a sense of fullness and completeness, but one that must incorporate its own failure, 
and this is again how the mirage of the child imago in the Mirror Stage is key to 
understanding how the logic of congruency is fantasmatic:   
Fantasy operates so as to conceal or close off the radical contingency of social 
relations. It does this through a fantasmatic narrative or logic that promises a fullness-
to-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome ... or which foretells of 
disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable.35 
 
Indeed, congruency fantasies either suppress and mask differences, or create an image 
of an harmonious whole whereby differences and divisions coexist in peace and in 
their diversity make the whole congruent since ‘... fantasy is precisely the way the 
antagonistic fissure is masked’.36 The modern fantasmatic project of 
(national/societal) congruency ushered by the Abbé Sieyès, as I show below, 
nonetheless, is not merely a discursive or structural filling whereby society, the 
nation, ‘we’ is constructed and filled with meaning. Rather, the fantasy of congruency 
becomes palpable through affect, that is, by invoking bodily jouissance, which refers 
to ‘… the powerful, bodily enjoyment that drives human desire’.37 Bodily enjoyment 
that are ‘always-already lost’.38 Simply think about national myths and narratives, or 
what Duncan Bell calls ‘mythscapes’, which narrate the past as a one-dimensional, 
often self-aggrandisement, story by which identity is forged and legitimated, and 
through which prospective political programmes are rendered intelligible and often 
embroiled with eschatological elements.39 This is where the heroic past and ‘Golden 
Age’ of nations and societies are invoked, not only to consolidate collective 
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sentiment, but also to justify continuous and future struggles designed to fashion and 
perfect the imagined national/social monism. Such myths in order to sustain their 
affective coordinates project their present incompleteness onto an Other, the Jew in 
the Nazi/anti-Semitic worldview or the immigrant in contemporary populist European 
discourse.40 This Other is not so much the ‘remainder’ of a sovereignty based 
international system; rather, this Other stands for difference as such and, 
consequently, is blamed for ‘our’ inability to achieve congruency, the fulfilment of 
the fantasmatic utopia, and for stealing ‘our’ enjoyment by taking our jobs and 
exploiting our welfare system, by marrying our daughters and destabilising our 
perceived cultural stability.41    
Fantasmatic projects, therefore, have an affective quality in the sense that they 
cover the lack and the split nation/society by promising future closure, but at the same 
time ensuring such realisation is never attained for such mode of congruency 
‘…would kill desire, induce anxiety, and put identification processes in danger’ thus 
creating a trauma/nightmare.42 It is this that makes the imagined congruity of the 
nation/society such a powerful emotive ideal, a leitmotif that is never attained and 
thus continuously reinvigorated and re-articulated, precisely because any attempt at 
satisfying the lack (of unity) in the nation/society will reveal the split itself, the void 
behind the fantasmatic mask of closure, fullness and congruency.  
Bells’ ‘mythscape’, therefore, is not only part of a nation’s ‘invented 
tradition’, its ‘imagined community’ narrative or ‘... the particularity or specificity of 
its world of significations’ by which it is rendered real. 43 What national and social 
myths demonstrate is actually the continuous attempt to recapture the lost enjoyment, 
to establish the authentic community by getting rid of the obstacle, the Other, who 
stands for the blocked identity.44  
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This is precisely the added-value of the analytical category of fantasy and how 
it can assist us in re-reading the ‘nation-state’ problématique, namely in that fantasy is 
not merely a tool designed to show how national/societal identities are forged or how 
they are imagined and/or socially constructed; rather, the fantasy of congruency 
demonstrates the negation inherent in any ‘mythscape’ and/or ‘social imaginary’ since 
fantasies of congruency always incorporate their own impossibility, the inability to 
recoup their lost golden age or to fully achieve the utopian mode of unity and 
fulfilment.45 This is because what comes before or lies underneath fantasy is not 
reality, but a lack of any meaningful sense of being. Equally important, the category 
of fantasy allows us to interrogate the libidinal investment in national/societal 
congruency projects, that is, the ways in which congruency fantasies are able to hail 
people through bodily affect and an appeal to recapture the always-already lost 
enjoyment.46  
The point here is not to extrapolate from the human unit to the social one as if 
the social unit is merely an aggregate of persons. My deployment of Lacan’s Mirror 
Stage and the logic of fantasy is strategic and analytical thus enabling me to 
understand the affective power of fantasmatic projects, indeed how (certain) fantasies 
are able to interpellate people and emotively mobilise society, whilst creating a sense 
of identification, an identification which is ambiguous and incomplete at its core.  
 
ABBÉ SIEYÈS AND THE BREAK-UP OF THE STATE AS MODALITY OF CONGRUENCY  
The Abbé Sieyès’ discourse is often mentioned as the birth of the ‘nation-state’, a 
political order based on popular sovereignty and ‘… the fusion of state and nation’.47 
This reading is somewhat problematic because in Sieyès’ formula the state of early-
modernity is not fused with the novel notion of the nation, the Third Estate; rather, the 
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state model of early-modernity is challenged and fragmented and then re-articulated 
and re-positioned. To Sieyès, the state is important but only if it represents the already 
in existence complete nation. Perhaps, this is the source of contemporary readings of 
Sieyès, because the ultima ratio of Sieyès’ discourse is indeed an alignment of state 
and nation, but only if the state is the expression of the complete nation, and not 
solely a fusion of the two. This means, as I explicate below, that with Sieyès the 
subject/object that arises and thus becomes a site of interventions is not so much the 
state, the nation or the so-called ‘nation-state’, but rather the incomplete society, that 
is, a fantasy of congruency of population with space and authority that is already-lost 
and is thus always-desired. 
In his Pamphlet, What is the Third Estate? The Abbé Sieyès critiques not only 
eighteenth century France but the contemporary European system of governance.48 
What is problematised in this work, and in other pamphlets Sieyès published at the 
same time (Sieyès, [1789] 2003), is the inequality amongst men with respect to rights 
and the power to govern. In other words, Sieyès problematises the aristocratic system 
of his time, what he defines as ‘palace aristocracy’, and maintains that the Third 
Estate constitutes the majority in France.49 It carries most of the burden of daily life 
and yet has no power and is actually ruled by a minority of nobility and clergy-men. 
The Third Estate is the ‘people’, a unity of individuals, which makes the nation. In 
other words, to Sieyès, the ‘people’ is the source of authority; it is united and 
complete and thus must be expressed through and by the state. The two signifiers, 
‘nation’ and ‘people’, are thus rendered synonymous: ‘all public powers ... come from 
the people, that is to say, the nation’, and ‘[t]hese two terms ought to be 
synonymous’.50 This means that with Sieyès it is no longer the ‘state’ commanding 
authority. The nation and the people, which are the same to Sieyès, are the source of 
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legitimacy and authority/sovereignty, though the question that now emerges with this 
discourse is whether, firstly, the ‘people’ is indeed complete and, secondly, whether it 
is expressed in its own state. 
   Sieyès details at length the current political system in France and explicates 
what can and should be done to reform the political system and empower the Third 
Estate, the nation. Sieyès begins with a definition of the Third Estate. He asserts that 
the Third Estate is in effect the majority of people who provides most of the public 
goods and services and who engages in private employment as well as the ‘... liberal 
and scientific professions’.51 The Third Estate, to Sieyès, is the nation, indeed ‘... a 
complete nation’52, which should be freed to govern itself, and that other privileged 
orders have no place in its midst. The Third Estate, the nation, is thus the main 
discursive field since it ‘... encompasses everything pertaining to the Nation, and 
everyone outside the Third Estate cannot be considered to be a member of the Nation. 
What is the Third Estate? EVERYTHING’.53  
 The idea of the Third Estate as the nation represents in Sieyès’ writings a 
totality, a congruity of individuals, who share together the burdens of society and the 
power to govern, indeed to operate state apparatuses, as Sieyès offers ‘… a theory of 
the complete nation as an embodiment of utilitarian or commercial sociability 
operating through the reciprocities of the division of labour’.54 Here is where 
Rousseau’s idea of the will reappears, although in a very different schemata following 
the logics of majority rule and division of labour.55 To Sieyès, the people embody the 
common will, which cannot be appropriated other than in an equal approach to 
individual wills; each person has one will and hence one vote. Therefore, the power of 
governance cannot be in the hands of a few holding certain honours and privileges, 
but must be in the hands of the majority: ‘[r]easoned argument is pointless if for a 
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single moment one abandons the self-evident principle that the common will is the 
opinion of the majority, not the minority’.56  
The conceptualisation by Sieyès of the nation as a totality entails the notion of 
‘constituent power’, that is, the legitimacy of the Third Estate to freely govern its 
business and thus reject the legitimacy claims of both the aristocracy and the king.57 
What Sieyès then suggests – in contrast to Rousseau’s ([1762] 1968) idea of the 
‘general will’ or the Jacobin’s cleansing of ‘enemies of the people’58 – is a 
representative system designed to ensure the efficiency of state affairs but, equally 
important, to ensure the representatives come from and represent the complete nation:   
It is patently obvious that in national representation, either ordinary or extraordinary, 
influence should be in proportion to the number of individual heads that have a right 
to be represented. To do what it has to do, a representative body always has to stand 
in for the Nation itself. Influence within it ought to have the same nature, the same 
proportions, and the same rules.59 
 
The constituent power embedded in the idea of the nation à la Sieyès and his theory of 
representation is often taken as one of Sieyès’ innovations or contributions to modern 
political thought.60 My point, however, is that Sieyès’ theory of the nation and 
national democratic representation is not only about juridical power/legitimacy but 
that it also entails a fantasmatic function since what he offers is not merely a narrative 
of constituent power and the legitimacy of the Third Estate, but why the Third Estate 
is not yet fully congruent and in control of its fate, namely because of the nobility 
which claims to be the nation but are ‘simply a word’.61 This further illustrates the 
added-value of the category of fantasy, for what Sieyès ushers with his theory of the 
nation is an endless battle against obstacles to the legitimate and promised congruent 
telos. Sieyès’s discourse is thus not only a theory of legitimacy/constituent power but 
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a modality of congruency that entails its own failure, the explanation for why the 
nation is not yet fully congruent with the state. The ‘biopolitical fracture’ at the heart 
of the concept of the people, which ‘has no single and compact referent’, is thus both 
the drive and inevitable result of this fantasy of congruency. 62   
 
 
 Sieyès’ Third Estate as a New Subject for Analysis 
What Sieyès defines as the nation is not a romantic mythological subject, as German 
romanticists would have it, nor is it a socio-political model designed to liberate people 
from a ‘war of all against all’.63 Rather, what emerges here is a new category – the 
‘congruent society’ – which is imbued with the right to administer and rule ‘its’ 
juridical space. This is not only the idea of the nation as a common will, but most 
importantly that the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ ought to be aligned, but only if the nation 
is ‘authentic’ and complete onto itself. To Sieyès, this logic of congruency follows 
three necessary stages, all relying on the idea of the ‘common will’ and the necessity 
of a unified nation.64 The first stage is an association of individual wills, that is, a 
substantial group of people who wish to unite and in doing so they already form a 
nation. In the second stage, the individuals seeking to unite discuss their future socio-
political arrangement, that is to say ‘... they confer with one another and agree upon 
public needs and how to meet them. Here it can be seen that power belongs to the 
public’.65 In the third stage they produce a ‘government by proxy’, that is, a 
representative body that will be entrusted with the necessary power so as to execute 
the common will.66 The establishment of a government of representatives is 
unavoidable, for Sieyès, because a nation, being an association of numerous people, 
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cannot fully and directly engage with the public services needed to satisfy the 
common will.  
 Sieyès’ logic prescribes a new subject/object of analysis for knowledge 
production and juridico-political administration that is not predicated on a state 
organised according to privilege or a social contract between the people and the state. 
The latter point is key because Sieyès insists that the state and its various branches of 
governance are a manifestation of the people’s will, the common will, and thus the 
notion of a social contract is one that is premised on a common bond amongst 
individuals, and not between them and their sovereign/state: 
There is no other way to conceive of the social contract. It binds the associates to one 
another. To assume that there is a contract between a people and its government is a 
false and dangerous idea. A nation does not make a contract with those it mandates; it 
entrusts the exercise of its powers.67  
 
Nonetheless, the coupling of state and nation becomes in Sieyès’ discourse a 
paradoxical necessity.68 It is an impossible result, indeed a fantasmatic project, since 
it promises what can never be fully attained, jouissance, and thus continuously 
imagined. Firstly is the homogenisation of individuals themselves that through their 
will to unite form a nation. It is a unity of individuals in itself for the sake of a unity 
of wills. What then becomes necessary is the formal association of individuals into a 
juridico-political structure, i.e., the state. Therefore, to Sieyès, congruency stems from 
a homogenisation of wills that in its maturation produces the ‘nation-state’ couplet 
because the state entails a representative body that springs out of the body national as 
it holds the people’s interests.69 Its main language and operation are manifested 
through the law, and the law becomes the product of a unity of individuals and the 
congruency of the ‘people’ with its political system bounded by territorial 
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demarcation. ‘The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin of everything. Its 
will is always legal. It is the law itself’.70  
Here we can see how the relationship between identity, law and 
authority/sovereignty is construed quite differently from early modern thought as 
Sieyès fragments the state as modality of congruency and renders it possible only if it 
is the manifestation of the complete nation.71 The ‘nation’, accordingly, emerges here 
as the discursive space, rather than the ‘state’ in early-modern thought, and its 
relationship with ‘law’ is homologous, that is, the law is not solely a manifestation of 
the nation’s will, but it is the nation’s will. 72 The ‘nation’/‘people’ is rendered 
intelligible by virtue of, first, being true and identical with itself, an authentic and 
complete unity and thus embodying the law. However, second and as I also show 
below, the nation is made possible by virtue of being not, or at least not necessarily, 
concomitant with the state. Consequently, the state is not naturally synonymous with 
the nation and, therefore, one should critique and challenge existing states and inquire 
whether the ‘true’ and complete nation is indeed in power and thus expressed in its 
own state as this is not pre-given. The normative ideal, as I explained earlier, is a 
congruency of state and nation – the nation being a unified collectivity and the state 
its tools of management and governance – but the reality, according to Sieyès, is that 
existing societies are not truly congruent precisely because the ‘complete nation’ is 
not manifested in the state.  
 The political discourse that emerges here, as Foucault explains, assumes a 
twin-relationship, albeit an ambiguous one, between the nation and the state, such that 
the nation cannot co-exist with other ‘nations’ in its midst, that is, other collectivities 
like the nobility. 73 The nation encompasses everything; it provides the services and 
goods needed in a society.74 Therefore, the nation ought to be embedded in a state that 
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speaks through law and is bounded by foundational laws, a constitution.75 The state, 
however, is the organisation of the existing nation and thus the only right form of its 
expression. The discourse now is not only one of social contracts, sovereignty or 
‘separation of powers’; instead, it invokes the right of the nation that is already 
homogeneous in its entirety and thus aspires legitimately, according to Sieyès, to 
coincide with the state. 
 This further demonstrates the fantasmatic nature of Sieyès’ Third Estate, that 
is, the socio-political and biopolitical fracture at the heart of the nation, which can 
never be eliminated for that will simply annul the all notion of the nation. This is 
because the nation, in Sieyès’ discourse, exists both before and independently of the 
state and at the same requires through its constituent power to manifest itself in, and 
thus merge, with the state. The nation is not only a subject of juridical power 
(functionality/capability),76 but a fantasmatic subject that continuously strives for 
congruency and at the same time entails its own impossibility.  
This, to reiterate, further stipulates the discursive rupture taking place in late 
eighteenth century thought and specifically with Sieyès, since the old (early-modern) 
practices of sovereign power are now transformed into a fantasy of a monistic society, 
a society in an endless project and thus a constant war.77 Sieyès and the French 
Revolutionaries have stipulated the supposed completeness and homogeneity of the 
nation as the highest source of authority, but at the same time they have also begun 
‘… a long struggle to create it’.78 This moment is thus part of the ‘...emergence of ‘‘us 
versus them’’ discourses as a challenge to the traditional principle of sovereignty’,79 
for now it is a ‘race war’, which means that ‘true’ completeness of society is 
constantly threatened by ‘enemy race’, who/which is the obstacle to the fantasy of the 
congruent society, indeed the Other blamed for the unfulfilled congruity.80 
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The Discursive Practices of Teleology, Representation and the Fantasy of 
Congruency 
Sieyès’ logic is an inversion of Hobbes’ notions of the ‘people’ and the ‘state’ where 
sovereignty is the people and thus the idea of the ‘people’ can only exist via the state 
(which constitutes the ‘people’ through the unification of individuals and through 
their subordination to one will).81 Sieyès, accordingly, fragments Hobbes’ state as the 
modality of congruency in early-modern thought and maintains that the idea of the 
‘people’/‘nation’ exists prior to the state and is not established through the state – 
unlike Hont’s idea that both Sieyès and Hobbes offer a theory of ‘indirect popular 
sovereignty’.82 Whilst Hobbes’ state legitimacy came from its past, that is, the 
transition from the so-called ‘state of nature’ to the sovereign head, Sieyès’ Third 
Estate was prescribing for the future-to-come, but which can never become the 
present. This means that attempts to create congruency may have already taken place 
before Sieyès, but that it is with Sieyès that a fantasy of congruency is fully 
articulated, a fantasy that subscribes a plan for the future, rather than justifying the 
past-present.83 
  Moreover, the state model of early-modernity as a congruent entity is 
challenged, as Sieyès asserts that the state cannot be one, a unity per se, and must 
therefore be a manifestation, indeed a juridical, social and political embodiment, of 
the nation (and not a contract between the people and their ruler/sovereign).84 This is 
key, for it shows again that Sieyès’ discourse is not so much about the ‘nation-state’ 
or the fusion of state and nation. This is because whilst Sieyès’ formula does ascribe 
an important role for the state, it is nonetheless only constituted through a 
manifestation, an expression of an already existing and complete nation, the Third 
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Estate. The subject/object that arises with Sieyès is, therefore, the fantasy of 
congruency, a totality that is conditioned by the expression of a complete nation in a 
state apparatus of ‘its’ own.  
The discursive practices through which the ideal of the congruent society is 
established and constituted are those of teleology and representation. First, the state is 
not construed as the existing manifestation of a union of many, or a social contract; 
rather, the state is now the goal of the nation. To Sieyès, the ideal state is the ultimate 
and complete manifestation of the nation which exists prior to the state. As such, and 
second, the state can and should only represent the ‘real’ nation. The knowledge 
system that emerges here is not the knowledge of state affairs as with cameralism 
(Kameralwissenschaft), but rather a knowledge system of society – the ‘congruent 
society’. 85 The questions that society should then ask itself are not whether the state 
is secured or wealthy, or whether it pertains to the common-good; rather, society now 
asks itself: are we a ‘real’ and complete nation? Are we indeed a nation that manifests 
its ‘completeness’ in a state? This demonstrates that with Sieyès, the fantasmatic 
function of the Third Estate is two-fold. The nation and the state are indeed in an 
endless relationship, that is, ‘… between the nation’s statist potential and the actual 
totality of the state’.86 But society must now also interrogate its alleged 
‘completeness’ and totality. Is the nation indeed congruent onto itself and whether, 
once we have established national congruency, is it congruent with the state? 
What is constituted here is the subject/object of the incomplete society that 
now structures its internal/external relations and knows itself via the fantasy of 
congruency. Jens Bartelson is thus correct in arguing that Sieyès’ discourse is circular 
because ‘... the concept of a nation state comes to express nothing more than a 
vaguely tautological relationship between two entities which are merely numerically 
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distinct from each other’.87 By this, Bartelson means that with Sieyès the nation 
concept is both ‘… the ultimate source of all authority’ but also the desired objective 
of the revolution, which is to exclude other orders from within the nation (e.g., clergy, 
nobility) and manifest the nation within ‘its’ state.88 In other words, the ‘nation’ pre-
supposes the state but nonetheless requires to be aligned with the state, which in turn 
constitutes the idea of the nation.89 But is not this state-to-nation tautology that which 
indeed produces the fantasy of congruency? It is a fantasmatic project, I suggest, by 
virtue of being an endless process; a constant apparatus of becoming that is never 
satisfied and cannot. The ‘tautological’ logic is thus what allows ‘society’ to know 
itself not only through the historicization and temporalization of its identity (as well 
as the construction of narratives and social imaginaries);90 rather, society knows itself 
also through constant efforts at achieving the ideal of congruency, which can never be 
truly attained and yet must always be envisioned. The fantasy of societal congruency 
thus prescribes a utopian ultima ratio, the promise of jouissance, but at the same time 
introduces a prohibition on obtaining congruity, an explanation for why congruity is 
not yet achieved, either because we are not a complete nation and/or because we do 
not fully express our will in a state of our own.91 
 
Back to the Present and Avenues for Future Research 
In this paper I suggested to re-read Sieyès’ text and to revisit the ‘nation-state’ 
problématique. I argued that late eighteenth century thought does not produce the so-
called ‘nation-state’ model, a fusion of the old modality of state sovereignty with that 
of popular sovereignty. My argument was that since the late eighteenth century the 
key subject/object that emerges is not solely the ‘nation-state’, but an ideal of 
congruency, a congruency of population, authority and space whether it is structured 
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around the state, nation or society markers or any other sign that pertains to an 
imagined collectivity. This ideal of congruency, I argued, can be read as fantasy, that 
is, a narrative that supports the contingency of social life and the incompleteness of 
‘our’ society and how this is the result of an obstacle, an Other, who had stolen our 
enjoyment, the key to our promised future of congruency and fulfilment. Such 
fantasies of congruency, I suggested, cannot be realised for they will simply reveal the 
void of, and in, our imagined collectivity. Fantasy, accordingly, must continuously 
reproduce and re-invoke its becoming through affective technologies, offering an 
explanation for why ‘we’ are not yet congruent but at same time keeping us from fully 
eliminating the obstacle, the Other, for that will simply result in trauma.92  
 Revisiting the ‘nation-state’ problématique through Sieyès can assist us in re-
assessing the historical changes in the notion of the nation and the state, thus further 
exploring genealogically the continuities and changes in the production of congruency 
as well as Sieyès’ effects on post-revolutionary discourses and practices.93 The 
creation of the citizen-subject in 1789 and the oft-cited distinction between civic-
based and ethnic-based forms of nationalism, or between the “‘demos’ of citizens” 
and the “‘ethnos’ of fellow countrymen’ is a point to consider.94 In Sieyès’ discourse 
of congruency the authenticity and comprehensiveness of the nation is juxtaposed to 
the clergy and the nobility, which thus constitute in those days the Other, the obstacle 
to achieving full French congruency. A fantasy of congruency that has come to be 
based on the ideals of citizenry, the republic and the rejection of class-based privilege. 
Nonetheless, to German romanticists like Johann Gottlieb Fichte the fantasy of 
congruency is achieved organically through the body of the Volk. Congruency is thus 
understood as a natural and primordial unity between the individual, its habitat (e.g., 
nature, way of life, livelihood, and historical narratives) and the community, an 
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indivisible and ‘authentic’ totality as the ultimate source of legitimacy.95 This is the 
Volksnation modality of congruency ‘… assuming that the demos of citizens, in order 
to stabilize itself, must be rooted in the ethnos of fellow countrymen’.96 The criterion 
for national membership can thus be differentiated between a primordial, albeit a 
constructed one, reading of the nation and nationalism and a citizenry and civic-based 
form of polity making. An issue that still plays a key role in nationality laws and types 
of regimes.97 And yet, as some have already pointed out, such distinctions create a 
false dichotomy between civic and hence ‘good’ nationalism and an ethnic and hence 
‘bad’ nationalism, as it also masks the problematic past of contemporary civic-based 
countries in the so-called ‘new world’, which entails the elimination of native 
populations.98 It also obscures the exclusionary practices of perceived republics in 
which the non-citizen can be marginalized in the same fashion as the non-ethnic.99 
Therefore and whilst this distinction is relevant to our understanding of the 
development of the notion of the nation, we can see how in both (ideal-type) cases the 
apparatus of exclusion takes place, that is, how it is the impossible ideal of the 
complete society that renders the various articulations of nationalism and the ‘nation-
state’ palpable. Equipped with this reading of the ‘nation-state’ problématique we can 
thus further look into the various articulation of the nation, the state and congruency 
in modern thought and practice. We can thus explore state and nation congruency in, 
for instance, Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History in which 
congruency gives rise to civilizational grandeur albeit only temporally.100 We can also 
engage with the linking of national congruency to democracy and freedom as 
expressed in the works of John Stuart Mill, or Alexis de Tocqueville’s writings on the 
congruency of New-England towns as a prerequisite to free and equal society.101 We 
may further interrogate the ambiguous system of nationhood and the protection of 
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minorities as ushered during the 1920s under the League of Nations.102 Or, as I have 
demonstrated in the introduction, interrogate the production of congruency in 
contemporary models of multiculturalism and communitarianism.      
I would argue that such a genealogical enquiry is important for it will 
demonstrate the pervasiveness of the fantasy of congruency despite it being practiced 
in myriad ways throughout modern history. In other words, it will show that despite 
various readings of the nation and nationalism, the impossibility of congruency is at 
the heart of modern socio-political life. The need to exclude and articulate a certain 
Other, an obstacle, is thus key to the fantasmatic project of congruency, be it the non-
ethnic Other, the foreigner or the non-citizen. Exposing the production of congruency 
and the myriad ways in which the process of exclusion take place, the processes of 
Othering, will have ethico-political implications for the ways in which we interrogate 
the socio-political, including democratic theory and questions of legitimacy, as well 
as the problematic relations between nationalism and liberalism.103 It is of course 
beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore these avenues, but some tentative ideas 
can be drawn. Firstly and as I have argued in this paper, the modern constant 
preoccupation with congruency means that as with Sieyès the problem doesn’t rest 
with the taken-for-granted ideas of the state and nationalism, what many argued 
against and defined as ‘state-centrism’, ‘statism’ and ‘methodological nationalism’.104 
It is actually the opposite, the incompleteness of the state, the nation and society. The 
unfulfilled promise of ‘our’ congruity that projects its failure onto the Other, the 
obstacle, and thus onto a future that must always be in the process of becoming and 
never realised. This means that critiquing traditional approaches throughout the social 
sciences as being statist and nationally-biased has somewhat missed the point, 
because the entire modern project around the nation, the state and society is precisely 
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how these are not yet congruent, how they are not yet secured and complete in 
themselves. Social divisions, cultural clashes, crime and immigration, insecurity and 
the threat of (nuclear) war and so on are testament to the ways mainstream approaches 
in sociology, politics and international relations didn’t really take the nation, the state 
and/or society as given; rather, it shows how these various tropes pertaining to the 
ideal of congruent collectivity were constantly constructed around and through the 
Other, who/which is responsible for the impossibility of congruency. 
Secondly, reading Sieyès and modernity through the prism of congruency also 
means that we should be careful not to simply naturalise and normalise contemporary 
modalities of congruency as post-national, multicultural and racially heterogeneous. 
These modalities may seem to reject the practices of national-chauvinism, racism and 
national xenophobia,105 but they still subscribe to the fantasy of congruity albeit now 
operationalised around the markers of heterogeneity and ‘unity in diversity’.106 For us 
to engage critically with the implications of the fantasy of congruency we might move 
beyond, and thus collapse, the binary distinctions, between ‘organic’ and ‘civic’ 
nationalism, ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ or between the ‘nation-state’ and the 
‘state-nation’.107 This will reveal how the ideal of congruency is still pervasive and 
why it requires more critical and reflexive thinking.   
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